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Abstract
This study assesses the relevance of poverty in the determination of aid volumes. In particular, it
investigates whether donors’ decisions about aid volumes are more reactive to changes in domestic
poverty than to those in the poverty of prospective aid recipients. This is particularly relevant at
times of economic crisis, which may seriously affect the proportion of donors’ budgets that is
devoted to foreign assistance.
The present study is based on the experience of a sample of members of the Development
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-
DAC). It finds that faster and greater changes in the volume of foreign aid occurred in response to
changes in poverty in the donor countries rather than in potential recipient countries. Furthermore,
donors’ attitude towards poverty in low-income countries differs from the one towards poverty in
middle-income countries.
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21. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on official foreign aid spreads along two main branches: one addresses the question
of whether foreign aid is effective at promoting economic growth and welfare, whereas the other
studies the determinants of its allocation and budget volume. Poverty plays a central role in the
analysis in both cases. The former branch has highlighted how poverty-based aid allocation is a
precondition for its effectiveness.1 As part of the latter branch, an understanding of foreign aid
decision-making trends can enlighten the policy debate and contribute to increase the effectiveness
of aid in economic growth and poverty reduction. This is particularly valuable when foreign aid
budgets are constrained.
Some literature has abundantly stressed the influence of donors’ domestic politics on aid policy
(Fleck and Kilby, 2001, 2006; Irwin, 2000; Lancaster, 2007; Milner and Tingley, 2010; Noel and
Therien, 1995; Therien and Noel, 2000). However, little has been written on what determines the
volume of aid. This study aims at shading more light on this issue, by comparing the relevance of
poverty conditions in prospective recipient countries versus a strictly domestic decision-making
framework in boosting or restraining donors’ foreign assistance.
It has been highlighted how a domestic pro-poor tendency seems to enhance donor generosity
(Round and Odedokun, 2004). Furthermore, some recent analysis has drawn attention to a possible
long-term relationship between poverty rates in donor countries and the amount of overseas
assistance that they grant (De Matteis, 2013), which has led to the contention that a ‘foreign aid
Keynesianism’ policy may have been in operation since the 1960s.2
Positions on foreign aid Keynesianism are diverse. Foreign aid critics may assert that foreign
assistance spending in itself may contribute to fuel domestic poverty in donor countries. This claim
may argue for some mutually exclusive results of resource allocation, with the allocation of
resources abroad draining productive domestic resources into non-productive aid initiatives.
Conversely, an optimistic perspective on the contribution that foreign aid can play in favour of
1 See De Matteis (2013b) for an overview of the literature on this topic.
2 This expression recalls the concept of ‘military Keynesianism’ (Henderson, 1998), according to which increased
military spending may contribute to decrease poverty, suggesting its potential as a countercyclical instrument. While
according to Griffin et al. (1982), military Keynesianism posits elite manipulation of defense spending as a
countercyclical tool, Henderson (1998) finds that only focused spending on military personnel may decrease poverty,
suggesting its potential as a countercyclical instrument. Likewise, the expression can be used with reference to foreign
aid. This supports the argument that aid is not pro-cyclical from the donor’s perspective (Pallage et al., 2001).
3poverty reduction in donor countries is framed in the economic argument that sees development as
an investment that paves the way for opening new markets in the long term (Jarrett, 2011; Hugie,
2011).
Following from the above, in order to shed light on the relationship between foreign aid and
poverty, this paper compares the relevance of donors’ and recipients’ poverty in defining the
donors’ aid effort. The discussion below is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the methodology
and data used for this analysis; section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results; and section 4
summarizes the findings and concludes.
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
2.1 Methodology
This study makes use of time series analysis. In order to study the interdependence of time series
between foreign aid and poverty we refer to a linear relationship of the type:
ttt uxy  21  (1)
where:
ty represents foreign aid provided by donor i at time t;
tx represents domestic poverty experienced by either donor i at time t or by recipient j
at time t ;
tu represents the error term;
1 and 2 represent the coefficients to be estimated.
Once the condition of stationarity of the series and their co-integration are verified, the Error-
Correction Mechanism (ECM) is adopted:
  tttt uxyxy  121321  (2)
4where  indicates the change in value between one period and the previous one (t and t-1).
Within the framework considered above, this model can be interpreted by considering how donors
adjust their foreign aid budget from one period to the next in response to changes in either domestic
or recipient poverty (in this case indicated by tx ), as well as to the previous disequilibrium
between the allocated foreign aid budget and the size of either domestic or recipient poverty. From
this perspective, the coefficient 2 measures the short-run effect in the process of adjustment and
the coefficient 3 measures the speed of adjustment in response to identified discrepancies accrued
during the previous period. The error correction term   121  txy  can be interpreted as the
deviation from the long-term equilibrium between foreign assistance and poverty, where the
coefficient 2 measures the long-run effect in the process of adjustment.
2.2 The data
This study makes use of data on foreign assistance provided by a sample of donor countries and
data on poverty in the same group of donor countries and in the combined category of low- and
middle-income recipient countries. The data cover the three decades from 1980 to 2010; the sample
of donor countries comprises 21 members of the DAC group,3 and the group of low- and middle-
income recipients is composed of 75 countries.4
For the purposes of this study, donor commitment to foreign assistance is preferable to
disbursement as the former most accurately reflects the original donor intent.5 However, for a
comprehensive perspective we employ OECD data on both total net official development aid
commitment and disbursement, expressed in 2010 constant US dollars.
3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
4 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia.
5 Despite this important distinction, supply-side models of foreign assistance often use data on disbursements. This is
understandable when it is necessary to take the recipient’s absorption capacity into account.
5The data available on poverty are rather scanty. To optimize the use of the available information,
various measures of poverty have been used in this study and, wherever feasible, data from different
sources have been combined. Poverty lines based on 40%, 50%, and 60% of current median income
after taxes and transfers have been used as measures of poverty in the donor countries. The OECD
dataset provides the main source of these data, complemented by data from Eurostat and the US
Census.6 Data about poverty in low- and middle-income countries were sourced through the World
Bank World Development Indicators. In addition to the above, under the consideration that poverty
adjusts slowly to underlying factors, missing values in the poverty dataset have been partly imputed
through linear interpolation.7
It is important to consider how different measures of poverty provide different perspectives on its
evolution over time. This is particularly relevant when comparing different contexts. For instance,
while poverty rates – i.e. the share of the population below a poverty line – and poverty gaps – i.e. a
measure of how poor the poor are with reference to a poverty line – in low-income countries were
generally fairly stable until they began to decrease around the year 2000, the number of poor people
continuously increased due to the increasing size of overall population. The experience of middle-
income countries over the three decades considered here is instead characterized by decreasing
trends in all the poverty measures used in this study despite the increasing size of their overall
population. Finally, in the donor countries poverty rates and the poverty gap have remained fairly
stable, with mild increases recorded in the number of poor people over the three decades due to both
the low poverty rate and the low demographic growth rate.
3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
De Matteis (2013) assesses the existence of foreign aid Keynesianism by testing for the presence
and sign of a relationship between the evolution of poverty in donor countries and the foreign aid
that they grant and for the direction of causality. The same approach has been replicated here. In
addition, for comparative purposes, this approach is also followed here to test for the presence and
sign of any relationship between donors’ aid and poverty in the developing world. The results are
arranged in Tables 1 and 2 below, focusing on commitments and disbursements respectively. In
6 Data from different sources have been combined only with regard to 60% poverty rates, while all other cases make use
of data from OECD.
7 Interpolation has been applied only in the presence of a clear trend, and the gaps filled are never longer than five
years.
6each table the first part refers to the number of poor people, the second to poverty rate and the third
one to poverty gap.
Given the small size of foreign assistance budgets in comparison to government expenditure on
domestic welfare, the modest resources directed into foreign assistance are unlikely to have any
drastic impact on donors’ domestic poverty, and so this option is ignored here. Likewise, the focus
here is not on the possible effects of aid on recipient countries’ poverty, but rather on the opposite
direction of causality. In other words, while – contrary to the case of donors’ poverty – aid may be
considered to have an impact on recipients’ poverty, this eventual relationship is not properly
analysed here.
Tables 1 and 2 below report only significant values of 2 ,2 and 3 for each form of relationship
between poverty and aid series that satisfy the condition of stationarity and are found to be
cointegrated. Therefore, missing values identify either the absence of cointegration or the
insignificance of the coefficients.
The number of missing values is higher in Table 2 and coefficient values are generally higher in
Table 1. Both points suggest that the relationship between poverty and aid is stronger when dealing
with commitments than with disbursements. This supports the consideration above, as the former
seems to reflect the donors’ intent better.
Another general consideration that helps to define the link between poverty and aid refers to the
different long- and short-term reactions of aid volume to changes in poverty. In all cases where the
values of both 2 and2 are significant the absolute value of the latter is higher, hinting at a stronger
poverty-aid relationship in the short run. This applies to both commitments and disbursements, as
well as to both donors’ and global poverty.
7Table 1 Relationship between poverty and aid commitment*
poverty line
2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c'
Australia 1.33 2.28 1.26 1.32 1.05 2.95 19.01 1.15 0.72 0.76 -2.42 1.03 -1.00 0.99
Austria 2.33 0.46 1.35 0.55 1.45 0.53 -1.15 0.49
Belgium -1.17 -1.65 1.79 -3.84 -6.20 0.54 -1.60 0.60
Canada -0.96 0.54
Denmark -0.98 0.78 0.99 0.98 1.16 1.08 -0.71 0.54
Finland
France 0.60 0.62 0.40 0.47 -1.34 0.66 -0.56 0.60
Germany 1.03 0.42 -1.00 0.42
Greece 3.99 1.08
Ireland
Italy -1.16 0.41 -1.41 0.44
Japan 1.03 1.12 1.40 1.15 0.84 1.06 0.95 1.05 -0.66 0.71
Netherland 0.92 0.82 -1.96 0.76 0.88 0.74 -0.97 0.93
New Zeland 1.22 0.67 1.42 0.60 1.45 0.62 -3.46 -5.38 0.52 -1.63 1.09
Norway 0.86 0.71 2.50 0.46 3.40 -3.15 0.45 -1.60 0.91
Portugal 3.36 0.84 6.20 0.91 -1.31 0.60
Spain 4.13 5.61 0.68 5.48 0.56 8.26 0.68 12.62 0.36
Sweden 0.73 0.79 0.71 0.73 0.81 0.68 1.22 0.52 -2.77 0.59 -1.33 0.81
Switzerland 2.04 1.11 1.36 1.24 -2.42 -8.37 1.00 1.38 1.04 -1.33 1.28
United Kingdom
United States of America 3.08 0.58 -3.13 0.51
Australia 0.30 0.44 1.19 0.18 1.13 0.79 1.26 1.19 -0.07 1.15 -0.02 0.86 -0.04 1.09 -0.02 0.81
Austria -0.06 0.41 -0.02 0.56 -0.04 0.41 -0.02 0.53
Belgium -0.24 -0.35 2.02 -0.43 1.47 -0.11 0.51 -0.03 0.50 -0.07 -0.08 0.56 -0.03 0.44
Canada -0.03 0.51 -0.02 0.54
Denmark -0.21 0.93 -0.02 0.68 -0.02 0.80
Finland
France -0.11 0.62 -0.04 0.64 -0.01 0.55 -0.02 0.62 -0.01 0.51
Germany 0.08 0.47 -0.05 0.44
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan 0.09 1.10 0.09 1.13 -0.03 0.55 -0.01 0.85 -0.02 0.54 -0.01 0.97
Netherland -0.21 0.54 -0.06 0.83 -0.02 0.94 -0.04 0.82 -0.02 0.89
New Zeland 0.21 0.63 -0.10 0.55 -0.03 0.90 -0.06 -0.10 0.65 -0.03 0.76
Norway 0.35 0.66 0.72 0.39 -0.10 0.53 -0.03 0.80 -0.06 0.55 -0.03 0.66
Portugal -0.03 0.70 -0.04 0.63 -0.04 0.67
Spain 0.90 0.66 0.73 0.45 0.59 -0.10 0.23 0.58
Sweden 0.34 0.76 0.15 0.73 0.08 0.68 -0.08 0.58 -0.02 0.82 -0.05 0.56 -0.02 0.62
Switzerland 0.17 0.99 -0.07 1.00 -0.03 1.40 -0.04 0.99 -0.03 1.34
United Kingdom -0.08 0.47
United States of America -0.08 0.45 -0.05 0.47
Australia -0.03 1.07 0.27 0.41 1.01 -0.06 1.07 -0.02 0.82 -0.08 1.01 -0.03 0.76
Austria -0.05 0.40 -0.03 0.52 -0.05 0.47
Belgium -0.03 -0.06 1.45 -0.04 -0.05 0.77 -0.07 -0.11 2.04 -0.10 -0.14 0.55 -0.04 0.44 -0.12 0.54 -0.05 0.34
Canada -0.02 0.55 -0.03 0.58
Denmark 0.05 0.66 -0.03 0.79 -0.04 0.93
Finland 0.22 0.44
France -0.03 0.63 -0.01 0.51 -0.04 0.63 -0.02 0.49
Germany -0.68 0.42
Greece
Ireland 0.11 0.05
Italy -0.12 1.11 -0.09 0.88
Japan -0.02 0.54 -0.02 0.99 -0.03 1.03
Netherland -0.04 0.87 -0.06 0.81 -0.03 0.88 -0.06 0.79 -0.04 0.83
New Zeland -0.09 -0.16 0.62 -0.04 0.76 -0.11 -0.20 0.58 -0.06 0.60
Norway 0.07 0.58 0.12 0.19 0.74 -0.09 -0.11 0.52 -0.04 0.67 -0.10 -0.13 0.47 -0.06 0.50
Portugal -0.06 0.63 -0.06 0.67 -0.07 0.66 -0.10 0.66
Spain 0.04 -0.27 0.57
Sweden -0.07 0.56 -0.04 0.63 -0.08 0.53 -0.05 0.52
Switzerland -0.07 0.98 -0.04 1.35 -0.08 -0.22 0.94 -0.06 1.26
United Kingdom -0.13 0.47 -0.15 0.50
United States of America 0.34 -0.08 0.49 -0.10 0.51
Number of poor
Poverty rate
Poverty gap
donor domestic low- & middle-income
40% 50% 60% 2$ Low 2$ Middle 1.25$ Low 1.25 Middle
* Only coefficients with significance above 0.1 are reported
c‘ : Direction of Granger causality
Source: Author’s analysis of data from OECD, Eurostat, US Census
8Table 2 Relationship between poverty and aid disbursement*
poverty line
2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c' 2 2 3 c'
Australia 0.99 1.06 0.76 1.14 0.65 2.45 7.75 0.94 -2.01 0.92 -0.85 0.83
Austria -4.95 -7.87 0.54 -2.16 0.62
Belgium -0.90 -1.54 1.62 -3.85 1.10 -2.97 -4.52 0.76 -1.14 0.48
Canada -1.02 0.38
Denmark 1.53 1.36 0.46
Finland
France
Germany
Greece 3.99 1.08
Ireland
Italy 10.39 1.26 -1.50 3.34 0.92
Japan 0.32 6.63 0.60 0.48 3.46 0.66
Netherland 0.84 0.43 -0.85 0.55
New Zeland 0.86 0.30 -1.18 0.60
Norway 0.62 0.56 -2.19 0.26 -1.27 0.52
Portugal 5.91 0.77 2.31 0.97 3.22 1.05 -1.11 0.78
Spain 4.31 0.50
Sweden -2.82 0.27
Switzerland 1.52 0.53 -2.17 0.23 -1.37 0.34
United Kingdom
United States of America 0.34 0.88 -3.29 0.54
Australia 0.21 0.15 0.64 0.56 -0.06 1.15 -0.01 0.65 -0.03 1.01 -0.01 0.46
Austria -0.13 0.52 -0.04 0.52 -0.09 -0.14 0.62 -0.04 0.48
Belgium -0.19 -0.37 1.80 -0.34 1.47 -0.08 0.57 -0.05 0.70
Canada -0.03 0.38
Denmark -0.04 0.00 -0.02
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy 1.37 1.22 -0.13 0.27 0.92
Japan
Netherland -0.02 0.77 -0.02 0.66
New Zeland 0.15 0.27 -0.02 0.43
Norway 0.25 0.56 -0.07 0.28 -0.02 0.75 -0.04 0.27 -0.02 0.75
Portugal 0.28 0.84 -0.03 0.83 -0.03 0.91
Spain
Sweden 0.08 0.31 -0.08 -0.05 0.29
Switzerland -0.07 0.20 -0.03 0.52 -0.04 0.21 -0.03 0.58
United Kingdom -0.03 0.45
United States of America -0.09 0.42 -0.05 0.48
Australia -0.03 -0.22 0.64 0.17 -0.05 1.00 -0.02 0.47 -0.06 0.90
Austria -0.13 -0.23 0.61 -0.05 0.49 -0.16 -0.31 0.64 -0.07 0.42
Belgium -0.02 -0.07 1.73 -0.03 -0.04 1.17 -0.05 -0.12 1.87 -0.08 0.70 -0.09 -0.11 0.74
Canada
Denmark -0.03
Finland 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.25 0.40
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy -0.10 1.35 -0.08 1.43
Japan
Netherland -0.02 0.61 -0.03 0.43
New Zeland -0.04
Norway 0.09 0.55 -0.06 0.27 -0.04 0.79 -0.07 0.25 -0.06 0.55
Portugal 0.02 0.08 1.23 0.02 0.09 1.22 -0.05 0.90 -0.08 0.95
Spain -0.11 0.34 -0.17 0.36
Sweden -0.08 0.29 -0.09 0.27
Switzerland -0.06 0.21 -0.04 0.62 -0.07 0.21 -0.06 0.59
United Kingdom 0.09 0.46
United States of America -0.08 0.50 -0.10 0.54
1.25$ Low 1.25 Middle
Number of poor
Poverty gap
Poverty rate
donor domestic low- & middle-income
40% 50% 60% 2$ Low 2$ Middle
* Only coefficients with significance above 0.1 are reported
c‘ : Direction of Granger causality
Source: Author’s analysis of data from OECD, Eurostat, US Census
9In terms of individual donors’ behaviour, in line with previous findings8 the results of this analysis
partly support the existence of aid Keynesianism. This is the case for approximately half of the
sample of donors considered, where there is both: a) a significant and positive relationship between
the evolution of domestic poverty and foreign aid, as identified by 2 and2; and b) a clear
direction of causality leading from poverty to aid, as verified though the Granger causality test.
With reference to aid commitment, this leaves Australia, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland as evidence cases, corresponding to almost half of the initial
sample. The case of the United States is controversial, since the direction of causality seems to
provide contradictory signals. Expanding to include disbursements would bring in the United
States, Portugal and the United Kingdom, although this would raise questions about the case of
New Zealand. For the other donor countries considered here the analysis does not show the
existence of a significant poverty-aid relationship, reports a negative poverty-aid relationship, or
highlights a direction of causality from aid to poverty.
Table 3 provides a summary view of the main direction of causality of the poverty-aid relationship
by donor. Since this classification is based on several indicators, in very few cases, due to
contradictory results, individual donors are associated with multiple options. In the case of poverty
in low- and middle-income countries a unilateral poverty-to-aid link appears to be prevalent.
However, as already seen with regard to donors’ domestic poverty, even in this case the relationship
becomes weaker and less clear as we move along the decision-making and implementation process.
In fact, when shifting from commitment to disbursement, evidence of the unidirectional poverty-to-
aid direction of causality decreases, while there is a substantial increase in the group of donors for
which no significant relationship between aid and poverty can be identified. This confirms the
general tendency, mentioned above, towards a stronger poverty-aid relationship in the short run.
8 See De Matteis, 2013
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Table 3 Granger-causality of the relationship between foreign aid and poverty
Poverty in donor countries Poverty in low-income countries Poverty in middle-income countries
Commitment Commitment Commitment
Finland Austria Australia Canada
Austria Australia Denmark Germany Finland Belgium Australia Austria Greece Belgium Denmark France
Canada Belgium Finland Ireland Ireland Canada France Portugal Ireland Spain Germany Norway
Greece France Sweden USA Denmark Germany UK Switzerland Italy Portugal
Portugal Italy USA Greece Italy Japan
UK Japan Norway Netherland Netherland
Netherlands Sweden New Zealand New Zealand
New Zealand Portugal Norway
Norway Spain Portugal
Spain Switzerland Sweden
Switzerland UK USA
USA
Disbursement Disbursement Disbursement
Austria Australia Finland New Zealand Canada Australia Austria Denmark Canada Australia Austria Australia
Canada Belgium Portugal Norway Finland Greece Belgium Denmark Netherland Belgium Portugal
Denmark Italy Sweden France Netherland Japan Finland Sweden New Zealand
France UK Germany Switzerland Norway France Switzerland Norway
Germany USA Ireland Portugal Germany Portugal
Greece Italy Spain Greece Spain
Ireland New Zealand Sweden Ireland UK
Japan UK USA Italy USA
Netherlands Japan
Spain
Switzerland
Not cointegrated
or insignificant
Only / Mainly
bidirectional
Poverty ↔ Aid
Only / Mainly
unidirectional
Poverty → Aid
Only / Mainly
unidirectional
Aid → Poverty
Not cointegrated
or insignificant
Only / Mainly
bidirectional
Poverty ↔ Aid
Only / Mainly
unidirectional
Poverty → Aid
Only / Mainly
unidirectional
Aid → Poverty
Not cointegrated
or insignificant
Only / Mainly
bidirectional
Poverty ↔ Aid
Only / Mainly
unidirectional
Poverty → Aid
Only / Mainly
unidirectional
Aid → Poverty
Source: Author’s analysis of data from OECD, Eurostat, US Census
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Having said the above, beyond any similarities in terms of the direction of causality identified in
Table 3, Table 2 highlights a critical difference between changing aid volumes in response to
poverty changes in donor countries and low- and middle-income countries. In fact the analysis
shows that all significant values of 2 and2 with regard to poverty rates and the poverty gap have a
negative sign, identifying a negative relationship between aid and poverty in potential recipient
countries. In other words, the amount of aid is not just unresponsive to the proportion of the
national population that is below the poverty line or to the depth of the poverty burden of the poor.
In fact, results show that the higher the proportion of the population that is below the poverty line,
or the deeper the poverty gap, the lower the amount of aid received. This refers both to short- and
long-term links between aid and poverty and applies to both commitment and disbursement. The
only exception to what seems to be this general rule occurs when dealing with the actual number of
individuals living below the poverty line, in which case the poverty-aid relationship is not the same
in low-income as it is in middle-income countries. While an increase in poverty in low-income
countries seems to be associated with an increase in the volume of aid, this is not the case in
middle-income countries. This applies to both commitment and disbursement. To check whether the
average income level of the poor population affects this relationship, two poverty lines – i.e. $1.25 a
day and $2 a day – were considered and no significant difference was found. In other words, the
national average income seems to make a difference, rather than the average income of the poor.
Italy is the only exception to the rule identified above. Here aid volumes fall with a rise of the
number of poor people in low-income countries. This applies to both poverty lines, but only with
reference to commitments, while no relationship is identified in the case of disbursements.
The values of 2 and2, whether negative – i.e. with reference to both poverty rates and poverty
gaps – or positive – i.e. with reference to the number of poor people – are found to be generally
greater when referring to donors’ domestic poverty than to poverty in low- and middle-income
countries, with very few exceptions. Interestingly, the main exceptions occur regarding the number
of poor, with positive values in the case of low-income countries and negative values in the case of
middle-income countries. This raises the issue of recent and ongoing changes in the poverty
landscape. One aspect of such changes is the increasing number of poor people in middle-income
countries, which is also due to various countries having recently risen from a low-income to a
middle-income status, despite the high proportion of poor among their population. The different
sign in the coefficients highlighted above seems to reflect both the donors’ genuine intention to
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target poverty and, at the same time, their current hesitation to target the poor in middle-income
countries for assistance. After all, the functionality of a poverty-efficient approach to aid allocation
is linked to the assumption of proper aid utilization by the recipient country. The increasing
proportion of poor people in the populations of fragile and middle-income countries highlights how
the “poor and stable” profile of the ideal aid recipient country is no longer valid. It can be argued
that donors may find it harder to persuade the governments of middle-income and fragile countries
to pursue pro-poor policy reforms and a poverty-oriented use of foreign assistance. This calls for a
diversified – and as yet unclear – approach, and presents an important area for new research. In the
meantime, any hesitation in facing this dilemma can only contribute to sharpening the contradiction
on whose poverty actually drives donors’ decisions about the volume of the aid that they grant.
Having considered the extent to which changes in poverty affect aid volumes, another factor that
can help to shed light on the link between poverty and aid is the speed of adjustment, that is the
speed at which donors adjust the volume of their aid to changes in poverty. Results show that
average values of 3 are generally significantly higher when dealing with domestic poverty,
showing that donors react more rapidly to changes in poverty at home than to such changes in
potential recipient countries. In the case of commitment, this applies to both poverty rates and the
poverty gap,9 while the difference is not significant when dealing with the number of poor. In the
case of disbursement, also the difference between the average values of 3 when dealing with the
number of poor people in donors and middle-income countries becomes significant, and the one
between the average values of 3 when dealing with the number of poor in donors and low-income
countries is just at the limit.10
In terms of individual donors, Belgium, Australia, Japan and Switzerland are among the fastest
donors to adjust their commitments and disbursements to changes in poverty.11 Belgium has the
widest gap between the speed of adjustment to domestic and to foreign poverty, with the former
regularly and abundantly greater than the latter, while Australia, Japan and Switzerland have the
lowest gap between 3 values.
At this point, the performance of individual donors is combined into a panel dataset in order to
define some of the major common determinants of donors’ decision-making about aid volumes. In
view of the high variability among individual donors’ performance, a random effect approach is
9 In terms of poverty rates: Pr (T>t) = 0.00 for low-income and Pr (T>t) = 0.045 for middle-income countries. In terms
of poverty gap: Pr (T>t) = 0.01 for low-income and Pr (T>t) = 0.05 for middle-income countries.
10 Pr (T>t) = 0.00 and Pr (T>t) = 0.10 respectively.
11 Although it is worth highlighting that Switzerland seems to be quick to adjust its commitments but less quick to
adjust its disbursements.
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expected to be appropriate. This has been confirmed through the Hausman test for all models
estimated in Table 4 about aid commitment and in Table 5 about aid disbursement.
First, the lagged term relative to the volume of aid provided by each donor is in all cases highly
significant, positive and among the greatest in size. This highlights how donors tend to regularly
confirm their decisions over time. It is expected that this conservative approach contributes to
increasing the predictability of aid supply.
The sign of the lagged term relative to the volume of other donors’ aid, when significant, is
regularly positive, showing that donors pay attention to their peers’ decisions when making their
own. This imitative attitude has led to talk of a ‘peer effect’ (Round and Odedokun, 2004) or ‘herd
instinct’ (Cassen, 1986; Riddell, 2007) among donors. Such herding behaviour does not seem to
happen for observable reasons, and it may contribute to increase aid volatility (Frot and Santiso,
2009). Contrary to Bertoli et al. (2008), who find the peer effect to be insignificant, our results
provide broad support for the existence of such an effect, at least concerning aid volumes and with
regard to both commitment and disbursement, to both low-income and middle-income countries,
and to both poverty lines in recipient countries.
Coming now to the focus of this study, the results presented in Table 4 and Table 5 provide limited
support for the theory of foreign aid Keynesianism. In fact, only a few models confirm the
relevance of changes in donors’ poverty as determinants of their aid volume. This result can be
interpreted as the consequence of conflicting behaviours within the donor sample, as considered
earlier through the time series analysis of individual donors. The fact that the analysis found
evidence of foreign aid Keynesianism in only half of the donor sample considered suggests that
such evidence may be harder to spot using a panel approach. In addition, the fact that all of the
small number of models that capture a positive relationship between donors’ poverty and aid
volumes refer to the same measure of poverty – i.e. the number of poor people – recalls the different
evolutions of poverty measures mentioned earlier. In other words, changes in poverty rates and in
the poverty gap in the donor countries appear to be too small to establish a significant relationship
with changes in foreign aid volumes.
In contrast, it is possible to establish a significant relationship between aid volumes and all poverty
measures for low- and middle-income countries. All the coefficients are negative for both poverty
rates and the poverty gap. This applies both in the case of commitment and disbursement. The
coefficients are small, but highly significant. A quick and easy interpretation of such results would
14
be that increases in poverty rates and in the poverty gap in low- and middle-income countries lead
donors to slightly reduce their aid commitment and disbursement. Ironically, this may not be too far
from reality; however, fortunately, results about aid per poor help to clarify this picture. In this case
the coefficients are regularly positive, meaning that an increase of the number of poor people is
followed by an increase in the amount of aid committed and disbursed. But this applies only to low-
income countries, as all coefficients for middle-income countries are negative. The latter recalls the
case of poverty rates and of poverty gap, with the main difference that the coefficients are now
much larger in size. This reflects a clear donor selectivity in favour of low-income countries.
Finally, with regard to the relevance of the institutional set-up in donor countries, neither the degree
of democracy nor the political orientation of the leadership seem to be of much relevance to
decisions on aid volumes. In particular, while the latter does not affect the decision process at all,12
it is interesting to consider how a higher degree of democracy seems to be associated with a certain
contraction in aid volumes in response to increases in the poverty of low- and middle-income
countries, although this only seems to be relevant with regard to commitment and not to
disbursement.
12 This contradicts the opinion that as donors become more conservative their aid effort is likely to fall (Tingley, 2010).
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Table 4 Determinants of aid commitment
Poverty line in donor countries
Poverty line in low-income and middle-income countries
aidt-1 from donor i *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
aidt-1 from other donors *** *** ** * **
povertyt-1 in donor country ** * **
povertyt-1 in low- & middle-income countries *** ** ** *** ** ** *** ** **
democracyt-1 in donor country * *
leftwing governmentt-1 in donor country
rightwing governmentt-1 in donor country
constant ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** *** **
R2  within
R2  between
R2  overall
N obs 300 300 300 300 432 432 432 432 460 460 460 460
aidt-1 from donor i *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
aidt-1 from other donors ** ** *
povertyt-1 in donor country
povertyt-1 in low- & middle-income countries *** *** ** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** ** ***
democracyt-1 in donor country *
leftwing governmentt-1 in donor country
rightwing governmentt-1 in donor country
constant ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
R2  within
R2  between
R2  overall
N obs 300 300 300 300 432 432 432 432 460 460 460 460
aidt-1 from donor i *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
aidt-1 from other donors ** **
povertyt-1 in donor country
povertyt-1 in low- & middle-income countries *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
democracyt-1 in donor country
leftwing governmentt-1 in donor country
rightwing governmentt-1 in donor country
constant *** ** *** ** ** * ** ** ** ** *** **
R2  within
R2  between
R2  overall
N obs 300 300 300 300 434 434 434 434 368 368 368 368
Number of poor
Poverty rate
Poverty gap
40% 50% 60%
0.233 0.233 0.235 0.233
0.223 0.224 0.224 0.2230.238 0.237 0.238 0.2360.190 0.191 0.190 0.190
0.558 0.546 0.558 0.5510.372 0.369 0.373 0.3730.846 0.821 0.849 0.824
0.949 0.948 0.948 0.9470.959 0.959 0.959 0.9590.868 0.875 0.867 0.874
0.998 0.995 0.998 0.9950.999 0.998 0.999 0.9980.953 0.963 0.950 0.960
0.586 0.585 0.585 0.5880.662 0.665 0.662 0.6660.519 0.513 0.518 0.517
(1.85) (1.37) (1.96) (1.46)(1.74) (1.32) (1.83) (1.40)(1.73) (1.31) (1.82) (1.39)
5.904 2.889 6.333 3.7484.494 2.556 4.929 3.2515.429 2.863 5.678 3.560
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
0.032 0.074 0.037 0.075-0.029 0.007 -0.028 0.0060.061 0.095 0.066 0.096
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
-0.024 -0.004 -0.023 -0.005-0.048 -0.028 -0.049 -0.031-0.002 0.011 0.001 0.010
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.023 -0.096 -0.026 -0.093-0.039 -0.091 -0.040 -0.088-0.040 -0.101 -0.043 -0.099
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.047 -0.025 -0.040 -0.017-0.037 -0.021 -0.032 -0.015-0.038 -0.018 -0.031 -0.013
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.0020.001 0.004 0.002 0.004-0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10)(0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09)(0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
-0.083 0.146 -0.070 0.087-0.075 0.070 -0.073 0.0220.114 0.306 0.131 0.257
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.552 0.566 0.552 0.5600.704 0.704 0.703 0.6990.352 0.370 0.351 0.366
0.236 0.236 0.237 0.2360.190 0.191 0.192 0.190
0.376 0.373 0.367 0.3760.384 0.377 0.375 0.3800.833 0.813 0.832 0.820
0.958 0.960 0.959 0.9600.958 0.961 0.958 0.9610.872 0.877 0.873 0.874
0.997 0.999 0.997 0.9990.996 0.999 0.996 0.9990.943 0.954 0.943 0.950
0.678 0.679 0.675 0.6800.661 0.661 0.657 0.6620.518 0.517 0.510 0.521
(1.66) (1.27) (1.95) (1.43)(1.78) (1.43) (2.13) (1.59)(1.76) (1.37) (2.12) (1.53)
4.610 2.814 4.598 3.7994.510 2.864 4.760 3.8445.120 3.275 5.129 4.466
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.049 -0.026 -0.043 -0.026-0.025 -0.002 -0.020 -0.0020.076 0.101 0.080 0.103
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
-0.063 -0.050 -0.056 -0.051-0.047 -0.034 -0.040 -0.0340.007 0.016 0.010 0.016
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.034 -0.059 -0.036 -0.055-0.024 -0.069 -0.026 -0.063-0.063 -0.110 -0.067 -0.105
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.018 -0.008 -0.024 -0.009-0.019 -0.008 -0.027 -0.009-0.019 -0.008 -0.026 -0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.012 0.005 0.012 0.0050.016 0.002 0.016 0.0020.011 0.010 0.013 0.009
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10)(0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10)(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
-0.088 0.024 -0.014 -0.042-0.072 0.038 -0.005 -0.0280.166 0.277 0.250 0.198
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
0.711 0.714 0.720 0.7100.699 0.708 0.708 0.7040.353 0.367 0.356 0.360
0.235 0.232 0.235 0.2330.238 0.235 0.237 0.2360.193 0.190 0.192 0.191
0.230 0.278 0.250 0.2510.269 0.337 0.310 0.2630.712 0.795 0.748 0.726
0.950 0.957 0.955 0.9370.957 0.961 0.961 0.9440.890 0.885 0.893 0.877
0.979 0.988 0.986 0.9650.989 0.996 0.996 0.9720.932 0.947 0.947 0.907
0.673 0.682 0.676 0.6780.654 0.664 0.657 0.6600.506 0.521 0.511 0.517
(2.14) (4.83) (2.02) (8.21)(2.07) (5.05) (1.91) (8.81)(2.15) (5.22) (1.93) (9.42)
-6.283 12.504 -6.490 19.800-5.302 14.326 -5.626 22.658-4.420 14.525 -4.904 24.856
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.014 -0.037 -0.014 -0.0430.011 -0.015 0.010 -0.0190.106 0.093 0.107 0.085
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.031 -0.063 -0.035 -0.059-0.013 -0.047 -0.018 -0.0420.027 0.011 0.024 0.018
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.068 -0.049 -0.067 -0.042-0.067 -0.052 -0.070 -0.027-0.111 -0.091 -0.112 -0.067
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.31)(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.34)(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.37)
0.175 -0.511 0.262 -0.9630.196 -0.540 0.293 -1.0370.201 -0.514 0.292 -1.051
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
0.187 0.120 0.141 0.2530.109 0.049 0.061 0.1820.094 0.031 0.061 0.107
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12)(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.13)(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13)
0.177 -0.106 0.122 -0.1070.197 -0.086 0.137 -0.0930.428 0.159 0.364 0.153
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
0.728 0.703 0.722 0.7090.723 0.698 0.717 0.7000.375 0.358 0.372 0.352
Low Middle Low Middle
1.25$ 2$
Low Middle Low Middle Low Middle Low Middle
1.25$ 2$ 1.25$ 2$
significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1
standard errors in brackets
Source: Author’s analysis of data from OECD, Eurostat, US Census
16
Table 5 Determinants of aid disbursement
Poverty line in donor countries
Poverty line in low-income and middle-income countries
aidt-1 from donor i *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
aidt-1 from other donors *** *** *
povertyt-1 in donor country ** *
povertyt-1 in low- & middle-income countries *** ** *** *** ** *** * *** *** ***
democracyt-1 in donor country
leftwing governmentt-1 in donor country
rightwing governmentt-1 in donor country
constant *** ** *** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** **
R2  within
R2  between
R2  overall
N obs 300 300 300 300 445 445 445 445 473 473 473 473
aidt-1 from donor i *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
aidt-1 from other donors *
povertyt-1 in donor country
povertyt-1 in low- & middle-income countries *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** ***
democracyt-1 in donor country
leftwing governmentt-1 in donor country
rightwing governmentt-1 in donor country
constant *** *** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ***
R2  within
R2  between
R2  overall
N obs 300 300 300 300 445 445 445 445 473 473 473 473
aidt-1 from donor i *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
aidt-1 from other donors ** *
povertyt-1 in donor country
povertyt-1 in low- & middle-income countries *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
democracyt-1 in donor country
leftwing governmentt-1 in donor country
rightwing governmentt-1 in donor country
constant *** ** *** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
R2  within
R2  between
R2  overall
N obs 300 300 300 300 447 447 447 447 378 378 378 378
Number of poor
Poverty rate
Poverty gap
40% 50% 60%
0.171 0.171 0.172 0.170
0.163 0.162 0.163 0.1620.175 0.175 0.175 0.1740.146 0.149 0.146 0.148
0.362 0.389 0.366 0.3930.223 0.238 0.226 0.2430.613 0.583 0.616 0.586
0.975 0.973 0.974 0.9730.978 0.978 0.978 0.9780.950 0.953 0.949 0.952
0.998 0.998 0.998 0.9981.000 0.999 1.000 0.9990.986 0.990 0.986 0.989
0.684 0.686 0.684 0.6880.764 0.766 0.764 0.7670.603 0.586 0.600 0.590
(1.31) (1.04) (1.37) (1.10)(1.26) (1.03) (1.33) (1.08)(1.30) (1.08) (1.36) (1.14)
3.862 2.489 4.105 3.1183.098 2.060 3.387 2.6294.834 2.320 5.000 2.934
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.008 0.022 -0.005 0.021-0.037 -0.017 -0.036 -0.0180.012 0.041 0.016 0.041
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.028 -0.013 -0.027 -0.014-0.039 -0.029 -0.040 -0.032-0.016 -0.005 -0.015 -0.005
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.002 -0.052 -0.004 -0.048-0.018 -0.055 -0.019 -0.052-0.014 -0.067 -0.018 -0.066
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.027 -0.017 -0.023 -0.012-0.023 -0.014 -0.020 -0.010-0.032 -0.013 -0.027 -0.010
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.0050.000 0.002 0.000 0.0020.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
-0.056 0.074 -0.045 0.029-0.074 0.016 -0.073 -0.0250.014 0.204 0.033 0.159
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.701 0.680 0.698 0.6760.813 0.800 0.810 0.7940.504 0.527 0.503 0.523
0.175 0.175 0.176 0.1740.146 0.148 0.147 0.147
0.228 0.238 0.223 0.2430.229 0.240 0.225 0.2450.613 0.586 0.615 0.594
0.979 0.979 0.979 0.9790.979 0.979 0.979 0.9790.949 0.952 0.949 0.951
1.000 0.999 1.000 0.9990.999 0.999 0.999 0.9990.985 0.988 0.984 0.987
0.778 0.780 0.776 0.7810.764 0.765 0.762 0.7660.600 0.590 0.593 0.595
(1.21) (0.99) (1.41) (1.11)(1.30) (1.11) (1.53) (1.23)(1.32) (1.12) (1.55) (1.24)
3.361 2.529 3.447 3.4633.225 2.370 3.447 3.2884.760 2.841 5.048 3.877
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.042 -0.030 -0.038 -0.031-0.034 -0.021 -0.031 -0.0220.019 0.041 0.023 0.042
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.042 -0.037 -0.038 -0.039-0.040 -0.033 -0.035 -0.035-0.013 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.038 -0.056 -0.040 -0.052-0.013 -0.044 -0.015 -0.040-0.022 -0.064 -0.025 -0.059
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.012 -0.006 -0.016 -0.007-0.012 -0.006 -0.018 -0.007-0.017 -0.006 -0.024 -0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.0020.008 -0.001 0.009 -0.0020.002 0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
-0.071 -0.016 -0.027 -0.080-0.078 -0.013 -0.036 -0.0760.045 0.164 0.107 0.093
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.811 0.805 0.817 0.8000.809 0.804 0.814 0.7980.504 0.523 0.505 0.516
0.172 0.170 0.172 0.1710.176 0.174 0.176 0.1750.150 0.146 0.149 0.146
0.154 0.205 0.185 0.1550.156 0.201 0.181 0.1660.510 0.608 0.546 0.556
0.977 0.979 0.979 0.9720.975 0.978 0.978 0.9690.947 0.949 0.953 0.947
0.995 0.998 0.998 0.9890.993 0.997 0.997 0.9860.973 0.988 0.984 0.973
0.776 0.781 0.778 0.7790.761 0.767 0.763 0.7650.578 0.598 0.583 0.599
(1.56) (3.49) (1.46) (5.60)(1.53) (3.64) (1.41) (5.97)(1.67) (3.90) (1.49) (6.60)
-3.700 9.970 -3.766 14.547-3.480 9.497 -3.747 15.679-2.386 13.395 -3.096 24.219
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.019 -0.038 -0.021 -0.040-0.010 -0.029 -0.011 -0.0310.043 0.031 0.045 0.023
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.021 -0.046 -0.025 -0.041-0.016 -0.041 -0.021 -0.0380.006 -0.012 0.002 -0.007
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
-0.065 -0.047 -0.063 -0.043-0.046 -0.032 -0.048 -0.015-0.064 -0.046 -0.067 -0.022
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.21)(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.23)(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.25)
0.150 -0.357 0.217 -0.6510.127 -0.351 0.203 -0.7020.107 -0.443 0.206 -0.980
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
0.086 0.041 0.049 0.1330.094 0.047 0.056 0.1300.070 -0.009 0.036 0.051
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09)(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10)(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
0.102 -0.105 0.053 -0.1000.096 -0.096 0.053 -0.1170.304 0.041 0.248 0.016
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.821 0.798 0.813 0.8080.821 0.798 0.812 0.8070.532 0.514 0.528 0.507
Low Middle Low Middle
1.25$ 2$
Low Middle Low Middle Low Middle Low Middle
1.25$ 2$ 1.25$ 2$
significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1
standard errors in brackets
Source: Author’s analysis of data from OECD, Eurostat, US Census
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4. CONCLUSIONS
This study has investigated the relevance of poverty in determining aid volumes and in particular
whether donors’ decisions about the volume of the aid they grant are more reactive to domestic
poverty than to poverty in low- and middle-income countries.
In general, the results show that the relationship between poverty and aid is stronger when dealing
with commitment than with disbursement. This was expected since the former seems to reflect the
donors’ intent better.
Along the same lines, in all cases this relationship seems to be stronger in the short run.
This study finds that domestic poverty plays a remarkable role in influencing the volume of donors’
foreign aid in half of the donor sample considered, supporting the theory of foreign aid
Keynesianism. In contrast, poverty in the developing world appears to be less relevant for such a
purpose. In fact, volumes of foreign aid react more strongly and faster to poverty changes in donor
countries rather than in potential recipient countries.
Interestingly, among the various poverty measures considered, aid volumes seem to better reflect
changes in the number of poor people than changes in poverty rates or poverty gaps. In other words,
the size of the poor population matters, while other important measures, such as the proportion of
the population living in poverty and how deep in poverty the poor actually are, seem to influence
donors’ decisions less.
Donors’ attitudes towards poverty in low- and middle-income countries differ. While a poverty
increase in the former is generally associated with an increase in the volume of aid, this is not the
case for the latter. Therefore, while donors’ intention to target poverty is acknowledged, their
hesitation to target the poor in middle-income countries with assistance is highlighted.
Looking beyond poverty, a few other factors involved in decision-making about aid volumes have
been considered. Interestingly, donors’ tendency to maintain a conservative approach over time is
combined with a certain imitative attitude of relevant peers’ behaviour. While the former helps to
increase the predictability of the aid supply, the latter may contribute to increasing its volatility.
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Finally, in this study the institutional set-up in donor countries seems to be irrelevant to decisions
on aid volumes.
The findings from this study lead to the consideration that, although poverty eradication is just one
of various goals that the international community aims at through the provision of aid, it is
reasonable to assume that aid effectiveness in tackling poverty can be raised by having a clear view
in mind of which poverty to target.
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